| INTRODUC TI ON
In support of the World Health Organization (WHO) and its global network of National Influenza Centers (NIC), the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has provided pivotal technical assistance to more than 50 countries in the development of surveillance and laboratory capacity for influenza virus. 1, 2 These efforts have helped nations describe influenza seasonality, identify influenza isolates for vaccines, and develop plans for pandemic preparedness. Regional and international initiatives such as the Asia Pacific
Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED) 3 and the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) 4 have further strengthened the ability of many countries to comply with the International Health Regulations (IHR), a 2005 legal mandate among all WHO member states to protect global public health security.
Many countries that conduct surveillance for severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) routinely test SARI specimens only for the presence of influenza virus 5 although other respiratory viruses clearly play an important role in causing severe respiratory infections. 6 Globally, influenza is identified as the etiologic agent in only about 10%-20% of SARI surveillance cases. [7] [8] [9] Without adequate reagents and routine procedures for testing non-influenza respiratory viruses, 10 the pathogens causing the remaining 80%-90% of cases from SARI sentinel surveillance are not identified. Data on noninfluenza respiratory viruses are essential for public health institutions to understand the burden of disease due to these pathogens.
In Vietnam, at the national level, the Ministry of Health General 
| ME THODS

| Laboratory algorithm and reagent procurement
In by the Influenza Division at CDC, was modified to include primers and probes for these 7 non-influenza respiratory viruses in order to ensure availability of quality reagents. Vietnam's NIC laboratories, NIHE and PI-HCMC, already had access to the IRR for influenza surveillance; through this current study, TIHE and PI-NT were newly authorized to receive these reagents. All reagents procured through the IRR were available to laboratories at no cost.
| Training for non-influenza viral diagnostics and proficiency testing
To ensure accurate use of these diagnostic tests, CDC engaged the RIs in a series of trainings. This included a 4-day in-country training of didactic and laboratory instruction held at the PI-HCMC in 
| Harmonization and expansion of SARI surveillance
Vietnam launched its expanded SARI surveillance initiative by hold- The data reported in this article are from specimens collected and tested following the revised SARI Surveillance Guidelines.
| Laboratory testing and data reporting
Specimens were collected at the sentinel sites and delivered once a week to the laboratories of the RIs. Each of the RIs utilized the reagents procured through the IRR for specimen analysis. At the RI laboratories, total nucleic acid (TNA, ie, both ribonucleic acids and deoxyribonucleic acids) was extracted from the specimens. The 7
non-influenza pathogens were tested by singleplex rRT-PCR assays, designed by the Division of Viral Diseases at the National Center for
Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.
11-16
Each week, epidemiology and laboratory data from the 4 RIs were sent to the epidemiology team at NIHE who prepared a weekly report, which was then distributed electronically to key public health stakeholders and partners. Two notable modifications were implemented to strengthen the data reporting process. GDPM designed improved SARI surveillance data reporting forms for RIs to reduce manual data cleaning at the regional and national levels, and GDPM, CDC, and PATH worked collaboratively with the RIs to integrate the SARI surveillance data into the digitized electronic data warehouse managed by the public health emergency operation center at GDPM. 
| Laboratory algorithm and reagent procurement
The RIs implemented the modified testing algorithm that was agreed 
| Harmonization and expansion of SARI surveillance
After the harmonization workshop, the SARI Surveillance Table 3 for results by sentinel site). Nearly half of all SARI specimens-1856 (46.4%)-were negative for influenza virus as well as the 7 common non-influenza respiratory viruses. Of all of the samples tested for non-influenza viruses, 11% were positive for more than 1 virus. There were 314 specimens with 2 viruses, 36 with 3 viruses, and 2 specimens with 4 viruses. Combinations of AdV, RSV, and RV constituted the 3 most common co-infection combinations. Table 4 provides a detailed breakdown of these data.
| Laboratory analysis and data reporting
The data generated from expanded SARI surveillance were in the South-East Asia region. 18, 19 Some studies have examined noninfluenza viruses in select patient populations such as children, [21] [22] [23] [24] refugees, 25 or hospitalized and non-hospitalized patients with respiratory disease. 26 Gaps still exist, however, in understanding which viruses cause SARI in Vietnam.
| D ISCUSS I ON
This study found that the most common non-influenza respiratory viruses were respiratory syncytial virus, rhinovirus, and adenovirus (16.2%, 13.4%, and 9.6%, respectively). Research from Southern
Vietnam, found that 14.3% of SARI specimens were positive for RSV. 20 Studies of Vietnamese pediatric patients with acute respiratory infections identified 23.8% and 23% as positive for RSV. 27, 28 As RSV is believed to be the most common pathogen causing acute lower respiratory infections in children, 29 it is predictable and consistent with our findings that the proportion of RSV in pediatric- A limitation of this study was that only influenza-negative specimens were tested for non-influenza respiratory pathogens. Given this testing algorithm, the study is not able to provide data on coinfection of influenza and non-influenza viruses. Additionally, while the presence of laboratory positive non-influenza viruses may suggest they are an etiologic agent responsible for clinical disease,
TA B L E 2
The total number of patients admitted to the sentinel hospitals that met the SARI case definition, the number of those SARI patients from whom specimens were taken, and the age distribution and median age of sampled SARI patients from each sentinel site TA B L E 3 Results of expanded SARI surveillance testing in Vietnam by sentinel site, provides data on influenza viruses, hMPV, AdV, PIV1-3, RSV, and RV
Influenza viruses
Non-Influenza Respiratory Viruses
Sentinel sites given the sensitivity of the rRT-PCR platform and the unclear role of non-influenza viruses in virulence, this conclusion warrants further research.
31-34
The 7 non-influenza respiratory viruses used in this study were selected based on historical data demonstrating their potential involvement in respiratory infections, as well as their potential for future vaccine development. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] Of the 7 viruses, significant progress has been made toward RSV vaccine development; however, despite several potential candidates, some of which advanced to clinical trials, no vaccine so far is both safe and effective. 40 Establishing baseline data for these viruses in people with SARI helps to provide evidence to GDPM to guide public health decision-making. ters. 41 In addition, healthcare utilization is reported to be 3-4 times higher in urban areas than in the mountainous regions in the north or central regions of the country. 42 As such, the SARI sentinel sites may be under representing poor individuals, especially from rural or remote areas. Because some of the SARI sites were pediatric hospitals, the age distribution was skewed, and 52.1% of the SARI specimens tested were in patients <5 years. This age distribution may have biased the results toward increased RSV detection. In addition, despite finding a large proportion of SARI specimens positive for RSV, it is not well understood whether the SARI case definition is appropriate for RSV, 43 TA B L E 4 Combination and number of non-influenza respiratory viral coinfections from expanded SARI is currently examining their capabilities for sustaining SARI surveillance for influenza and other respiratory viruses and considering respiratory surveillance through different event-based surveillance approaches.
In spite of these limitations, the existence of a SARI surveillance network in Vietnam provided a platform for collecting data on important non-influenza respiratory viruses, and the process of expanding the system offered an opportunity to revisit the data collection and analysis practices that were routine for SARI surveillance. As a multistep process, the expansion and strengthening of SARI surveillance continued to develop throughout 2016 and 2017, and will likely continue to improve with further attention and refinement to the system. The future integration of the expanded SARI surveillance data into the GDPM data warehouse offers additional potential benefit of reduced delays due to data sharing, reduced need for manual data curation, as well as provision of data to the public health emergency operation center for routine data analysis. 17 The process of expanding SARI surveillance to test for noninfluenza respiratory viruses has engaged numerous organizations in Vietnam ranging from sentinel hospitals, RIs to GDPM and international donor organizations. Additionally, in the era of GHSA the study demonstrates an ability to enhance and expand surveillance by building and extending upon existing in-country capacities.
While these data provide valuable initial insight into the burden of severe respiratory disease, the real value will only be realized over time as data are collected and analyzed consistently through multiple years. Such data can be used to understand seasonality, contribution by various pathogens to respiratory disease burden, and the risk groups of these noninfluenza respiratory viral pathogens in Vietnam.
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